

Understanding and Analysing Internet Connection Issues



What we'll cover:

- Problems “somewhere on the Internet” that may have consequences to “me”
- How we can learn more and what tools are available - at least some of them

What we'll **not** cover:

- Problems on your own network, i.e. internal network monitoring and tools

Preparing in Advance or Not?



Two Major Approaches

Continuous monitoring:

- When there's time and a will to prepare **in advance**
- Set up a tool, start periodic data collection
- Establish a baseline, observe **deviations** from that

Ad-hoc testing:

- When there's a problem **right now** and we'd like to investigate **quickly**
- Also when the issue is not anticipated



Control Plane



Looking glasses

A peek into BGP “from the other side” - do my routes get there?

- [RIPEstat](#) has a RIS based looking glass
- Many, many public ones, just highlights:
 - [bgp.tools](#)
 - [Hurricane Electric](#)
 - [Cogent](#)
 - ...and [1,000s more!](#)

RIPEstat

Looking Glass

Search: 193.0.14.0/24

Filter anywhere in AS Path

Include + Add

Exclude + Add

470 peers announcing 193.0.14.0/24 originated by 25152 and seen by 23 RRCs

AS Path	25152
Communities	25152:1363
Large Communities	25152:1363:65533
Extended Communities	-
Origin	IGP
Next Hop	103.142.153.17
Peer	103.142.152.18 at RRC00
Last Updated	2025-09-09T22:03:57Z



Control Plane - BGP Monitoring and Querying



BGP Activity

Sometimes it's best to understand what precisely happened:

- BGP Update Activity in RIPEstat
- BGPlay to replay BGP events/propagation as an animation





Control Plane - BGP Monitoring and Querying



BGP Visibility, History

Longer term views:

- Routing history in RIS
- Upstream Visibility in RIS



Control Plane - BGP Monitoring & Querying



Don't forget RPKI

RPKI can affect prefix visibility in real time

- Check your [Prefix Routing Consistency](#)
- ROAs (ROV), BGPSEC, ASPA validation can affect prefix visibility
- Validation and filtering “happens elsewhere”!

Prefix Routing Consistency ⓘ 🔗

10 ▼ per page Search...

Prefix	Origin	BGP (RIS)	RIPE IRR	Other IRR	RPKI	VRP
193.0.14.0/23	AS25152	✓ yes	✓ yes	✓ yes	😊	/23
193.0.14.0/24	AS25152	✓ yes	✓ yes	✓ yes	😊	/24

Showing 1 to 2 of 2 entries

Showing results for 193.0.14.0/24 from 2025-09-12 00:00:00 to 2025-09-12 00:00:00



Data Plane

The Basic Tools - Old and New



Of course we've had our tools for network debugging for ages now:

- ping
- traceroute
- dig
- "my traceroute" (mtr)
- ...

There's also NLNOG RING and RIPE Atlas as well

Measuring Damage with RIPE Atlas




RIPE Atlas

A global network of probes measuring the Internet in real time

13,400+ probes connected

800+ anchors deployed

35,000+ daily measurements on average (both user-defined and built-in)



Measuring Damage with RIPE Atlas




Anchor mesh

RIPE Atlas anchors support ping, traceroute, DNS, HTTP/S measurements

Each anchor performs ongoing ping measurements to all other anchors at four-minute intervals

Resulting 'mesh' of measurements lets us observe latency changes and packet loss between anchors



Baltic Sea Cable Damage



Partial timeline (focus on initial events we analysed)

- 17 Nov 2024: BCS East-West outage
- 18 Nov 2024: C-LION1 outage
- 27 Nov 2024: BCS East-West restored
- 28 Nov 2024: C-LION1 restored
- 25 Dec 2024: C-LION1 outage
- 06 Jan 2025: C-LION1 restored
- 26 Jan 2025: LVRTC outage
- 28 Feb 2025: LVRTC restored



Baltic Sea Cable Damage



Fri 27 Dec 2024 13:48
0 knots

It then carried on across four undersea fibreoptic cables, three of which registered failures around the time the ship crossed them. The ship was suspected by Finnish authorities of having dragged its anchor to damage the cables and was escorted into custody.



Sources: OpenStreetMap, Esri, Telegeography, Marine

First look



17-18 November

BCS East-West: Sweden-Lithuania

C-LION1: Germany-Finland

We looked at results in the RIPE Atlas anchor mesh between these countries around reported time of the event.


Country	# anchors
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Germany:	100
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Sweden:	15
---------	----

Finland:	12
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Lithuania:	5
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


Latency shift

12 hour before/after
time of event


Latency increase of
approx 10-20 ms
shortly before
08:00 UTC on
17 November

*We subtract the minimum
latency for a path during our
observation period to make
the latency jumps comparable*



Packet loss

Baseline of 0% packet loss
(with occasional spikes)



No significant increase in packet loss at time of the
cable outage (shortly before 08:00 UTC)




Latency shift

Latency increase of
approx 5ms a little
after
02:00 UTC on
18 November

Packet loss


Again, no significant
increase in packet loss
at time of outage



C-LION1 repair

28 November (17:30 UTC): C-Lion1 cable repair ship reported leaving the area after successful repair

Unclear what exactly causes these latency effects and the temporary increase in packet loss...




Beyond the Baltic: ES-PT Power Outage April 2025



Anchor mesh
measurements -
potential for getting
insights into outages

Power outage events
much harder to
measure compared to
cable outage events

Due to the
infrastructure being
brought offline by the
event itself



Cable Damage in the Red Sea - September 2025



Cable damage in the Red Sea

6 September 2025:
Reports emerge of
cable outages in the
Red Sea affecting:

- **FALCON**
- **SeaMeWe-4**
- **WACS: West Africa Cable System**




Cable Damage in the Red Sea - September 2025



Latency shift with packet loss

Latency increases of approx 20-30 ms accompanied by concurrent increase in packet loss.





There's also [Downdetector](#), [Down for Everyone or Just Me](#) and many other services to get signals from about the extent of a website problems

For censorship or network interferences information: [OONI](#)



DNS

DNS Answers As Seen By RIPE Atlas

Measurement 130805099

DNS lookup of *hunog.hu*


ONE-OFF DNS measurement to **hunog.hu**, via IPv4.

KHIPP beta [🔗](#)

OVERVIEW

RESULTS

DETAILS



☒ RTT ☐ RCODE ☐ Results ASNs ☐ Most Observed

<10ms: 92 **<20ms: 38** **<30ms: 25** **<40ms: 16** **<50ms: 22** **<100ms: 76** **<200ms: 68**
<300ms: 46 **>300ms: 103** **No Reply: 1** **No Report: 13** **Total: 500**

Result summary (latest, as of 2025-10-02 10:39:52 UTC) :

473 probes reached their target.

14 probes did not.

13 probes did not report (yet).

Min RTT: 0,211

Mean RTT: 188,43

Most observed answers:

• **hunog.hu: 5.28.3.19**

459 probes




[SHOW ON MAP](#)

• No Answers Available

27 probes

[SHOW ON MAP](#)

DNSSEC - dnsviz.net View Of hunog.hu





In The Future: The Role of AI/ML



Wouldn't it be nice to ask your favourite AI agent:

- “Can traffic from currently get from ASx in <city> to BIX?”
- “Was there a latency change between X and Y in the last 10 minutes?”
- “Compare DNS responses about <SOMETHING>.hu across all Hungarian providers and provide me the summary.”

Also:

- Monitoring of, and automatic notifications about, latency changes or packet loss towards my network (ML/anomaly detection)



Public Event Analyses



Many organisations offer event analyses or reports:

- RIPE NCC on [RIPE Labs](#)
- [Cloudflare Radar](#) (also [@CloudflareRadar](#))
- [Kentik Network Analysis Center](#)
- ... and many more

And of course big providers (AWS, Google, Meta, Azure, ...) have their own - private - view of the world.



Paid Services

Paid Services and Big Providers



Plenty of providers offer paid services in this area

- At a minimum monitoring, observability and alerting

Many of them integrate several, complementary data sources

- BGP information: collectors, looking glasses, etc.
- Flow information
- Active measurements: either continuous or ad-hoc



Questions & Comments



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THANK YOU!