

BGP Routing Security: Hijacks vs RPKI

Alastair Strachan RIPE NCC

What is the RIPE NCC?





<image>

RIR = Regional Internet Registry

- Not-for-profit organisation
- Funded by membership fees
- Policies developed by regional communities
- Neutral, impartial, open, and transparent

What is RPKI?




- A security framework using Public Key Infrastructure and Resource certification (X.509 PKI certificates) for BGP route origin validation (ROV)
- Allows resource (IPs) holders to prove ownership, and create authorisations (ROAs)
- ASNs can use ROAs to validate the origin of BGP announcements
 - Is the originating ASN authorised to originate a particular prefix?



Origin Hijack: Same Prefix



Prefix-P, 2001:db8::/32




This is a local hijack!

Only some networks are affected based on BGP path selection process.

Origin Hijack: More Specific Prefix






This is a **global hijack!**

All traffic for more specific will be forwarded to the attacker's network network.



How does it work?





Elements of RPKI





• RPKI system consists of two parts...



Trust in RPKI

- RPKI relies on five RIRs as Trust Anchors
- Certificate structure follows the RIR hierarchy
- RIRs issue certificates to resource holders








RPKI Chain of Trust






What are ROAs?




- An authorised statement created by the resource holder
- States that a certain prefix can be originated by a certain AS
- LIRs can create ROAs for their resources
- Multiple ROAs can exist for the same prefix
- ROAs can overlap



Hosted RPKI


- ROAs are created and published using the RIR's member portal
- RIR hosts a CA (Certification Authority) for LIRs and signs all ROAs
- Automated signing and key rollovers



Delegated RPKI

- Each LIR manages its part of the RPKI system
 - Runs its own CA as a child of the RIR
 - Manages keys/key rollovers
 - Creates, signs and publishes ROAs

- Certificate Authority (CA) Software
 - Krill (NLnet Labs)
 - **rpkid** (Dragon Research Labs)




Publication as a Service

- In-between Hosted and Delegated
 - Runs its own CA as a child of the RIR
 - Manages keys/key rollovers and ROAs
 - Maintain key pairs and objects and send them to RIR
 - RIR publishes ROAs on behalf of LIR

- Also APNIC, ARIN, RIPE NCC, NIRs
- AKA "Publication in parent" or "Hybrid RPKI"





Elements of RPKI



• RPKI system consists of two parts...



RPKI Validation




- Verifying the information provided by others
 - Proves holdership through a public key and certificate infrastructure
- In order to validate RPKI data, you need to ...
 - install a validator software locally in your network
- Goal is to validate the "origin of BGP announcements"
 - Known as BGP Origin Validation (BGP OV) or Route Origin Validation (ROV)

RPKI Validator





- Connects to RPKI repositories via rsync or RRDP protocol
- Uses TALs to connect to the repositories and download ROAs
- Validates chain of trust for all ROAs and associated CAs
- Creates a local "validated cache" with all the valid ROAs



ROA Validation Process







BGP Update

2001:db8:1000::/48, AS65500

Router uses this information to make better routing decisions!

Validated Cache

What's New?

RPKI Validators are Mature



- Much better than 5 years ago
- Installation, configuration, documentation is way better
- Big research work on vulnerabilities in 2021
 - Multiple fixes in all validators, mostly addressing potential DoS attacks
 - Source: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2203.00993.pdf

RPKI Validator Options



- Routinator
 - Built by NLNetlabs
- OctoRPKI
 - Cloudflare's relying party software

- FORT
 - Open source RPKI validator

rpki-client

- Integrated in OpenBsd

Links for RPKI Validators

https://github.com/NLnetLabs/routinator.git

https://github.com/cloudflare/cfrpki#octorpki

https://github.com/NICMx/FORT-validator/

https://www.rpki-client.org/

For more info...

https://rpki.readthedocs.io

Run Different Validators




Validator	Number (13/5/23)	%
Routinator	2297	79%
rpki-client	253	9%
OctoRPKI	181	6%
FORT	91	3%
Validator	87	3%
Other	6	0%


Source (13/5/23): https://rov-measurements.nlnetlabs.net/stats/

Steady growth: Adoption and ROAs














Source (14/5/23): https://certification-stats.ripe.net/

Adoption per RIR




RIR	IPv4 Addr. Space	IPv6 Addr. Space
APNIC	33%	23%
RIPE NCC	61%	37%
LACNIC	42%	23%
ARIN	29%	35%
AFRINIC	25%	7%

Source (14/5/23): https://ftp.ripe.net/pub/stats/ripencc/nro-adoption/latest/



Countries with significant change in IPv4 ROA Coverage






IPv4 Covered vs Uncovered: Hungary




<i>Magyar Telekom Plc.</i> hu.htc	<i>DIGI Tavkozlesi es Szolgaltato Kft.</i> hu.hdsnet		<i>Yettel Hungary Ltd.</i> hu.pannon	National
				OPC
<i>Vodafone Hungary Ltd.</i> hu.vodafone	KIFU (Governmental Info Tech Development Agency) hu.kifu	<i>Tarr Kft.</i> hu.tarr		
	Invitech ICT Services Kft. hu.deltav	Dravanet Co Ltd.		

Changes in IPv4 ROA Coverage











Questions

