



## 回路時間

# SafeLib: a comprehensive framework for Secure outsourcing of network functions

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#### **Motivation: Ukraine**

Microsoft

Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War This report offers five conclusions that come from the war's first four months:

networks. But Ukraine's government has successfully sustained its civil and military operations by acting quickly to disburse its digital infrastructure into the public cloud, where it has been hosted in data centers across Europe.

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#### **Motivation: NFV**

Type of appliance	Number
Firewalls	166
NIDS	127
Media gateways	110
Load balancers	67
Proxies	66
VPN gateways	45
WAN Optimizers	44
Voice gateways	11
Total Middleboxes	636
Total routers	~900

Enterprise w/ 80K users and tens of sites



#### NFV Approach



NFV enables virtualized network functions to run over an open hardware platform, reducing CapEx, OpEx, and accelerating innovation.



High Volume, Standard Server

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High Volume, Standard Storage

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High Volume, Standard Switch

#### **Problem statement: outsourcing security**



#### **Quick outline**

- Existing solutions
- Trusted hardware environment (=SGX)
- SafeLib: idea
- Safelib: high-level design
- Safelib: detailed design for complex stateful NFs
- Some performance figures
- Security guarantees
- Technical papers and code

#### **Existing solutions & limitations**

		Protection					Supported Functionality		Supported
	System	Header	Payload	Code	Policies	State	Stateful VNF	Stateless VNF	Operation
	BlindBox [4]	X	$\checkmark$	X	$\checkmark$	X	×	$\checkmark$	regular expression
Crypto	SplitBox [5]	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	X	$\checkmark$	X	X	$\checkmark$	range matching
	Embark [3]	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	×	$\checkmark$	X	×	$\checkmark$	range matching
	S-NFV [8]	×	×	×	×	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	X	generic operation
	Trusted Click [6]	×	$\checkmark$	×	$\checkmark$	X	×	$\checkmark$	generic operation
Trusted	ShieldBox [10]	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	×	$\checkmark$	X	×	$\checkmark$	generic operation
Hardware	SGX-Box [9]	×	$\checkmark$	×	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	×	generic operation
	SafeBricks [7]	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	*	*	$\checkmark$	generic operation
	LightBox [11]	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	X	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	*	generic operation
	SafeLib [12]	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	generic operation

- Standard encryption: NF cannot operate
- Fancy crypto approaches: limited operations w/ low performance
- Trusted Execution Environment based approaches?

#### **Trusted Execution Environment (Intel SGX)**







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#### SafeLib: high-level architecture

- SGX limitations!
  - Enclave memory size is limited
  - Transition between enclave and nonenclave region is costly -> performance!
- 3 libs for different NFs
  - Simple stateful
  - Complex stateful
  - Stateless



#### SafeLib: detailed architecture (lib2, complex stateful)



#### SafeLib: performance (LTE-EPC, MME outsourced)



Performance penalty is small(ish)

Performance scales linearly w/ #CPU cores

#### Key: choose appropriate libx for your VNF

#### SafeLib: summary

- Comprehensive\* protection for outsorced NFs
- Support for simple/complex and stateful/stateless NFs
- Minimal performance penalty vs. vanilla libVNF
- Good scaling properties for multicore
- Good usability for NF developers

Scope	Security Properties
VNF execution	Integrity
VNF state (flow stream)	Integrity and confidentiality
VNF policies	Integrity and confidentiality
VNF code	Integrity, confidentiality (at some level)
User traffic	Integrity and confidentiality



#### Papers...

SafeLib: a comprehensive framework for secure outsourcing of network functions E. Marku, C. Boyd, G. Biczók Under review in IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management

SafeLib: a practical library for outsourcing stateful network functions securely E. Marku, G. Biczók, C. Boyd 2021 IEEE 7th International Conference on Network Softwarization (NetSoft 2021), 2021

Securing Outsourced VNFs: Challenges, State of the Art, and Future Directions E. Marku, G. Biczók, C. Boyd IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 58, no. 7, vol. 58, 2020, pp. 1-8.

Towards protected VNFs for multi-operator service delivery E. Marku, G. Biczók, C. Boyd 1st International Workshop on Cyber-Security Threats, Trust and Privacy Management in Software-defined and Virtualized Infrastructures (SecSoft), IEEE, 2019, co-located with IEEE NetSoft 2019.

# "We believe in rough consensus and running code"

### https://github.com/eniomarku/SafeLib-TNSM